Skill v1.0.1
currentAutomated scan100/100+3 new
name: performing-purple-team-exercise description: 'Performs purple team exercises by coordinating red team adversary emulation with blue team detection validation using MITRE ATT&CK-mapped attack scenarios, real-time detection testing, and collaborative gap remediation. Use when SOC teams need to validate detection capabilities, improve analyst skills, and close detection gaps through structured offensive-defensive collaboration.
' domain: cybersecurity subdomain: soc-operations tags:
- soc
- purple-team
- red-team
- blue-team
- mitre-attack
- adversary-emulation
- detection-validation
version: '1.0' author: mahipal license: Apache-2.0 d3fend_techniques:
- File Metadata Consistency Validation
- Application Protocol Command Analysis
- Identifier Analysis
- Content Format Conversion
- Message Analysis
nist_csf:
- DE.CM-01
- DE.AE-02
- RS.MA-01
- DE.AE-06
mitre_attack:
- T1078
- T1685.002
- T1685.005
- T1566
Performing Purple Team Exercise
When to Use
Use this skill when:
- SOC teams need to validate that detection rules actually fire for the threats they target
- Red team assessments produced findings that need translation into detection improvements
- New detection tools or SIEM migrations require validation of detection coverage
- Analyst training requires hands-on experience with real attack techniques and SIEM responses
- Quarterly or semi-annual detection validation cycles are scheduled
Do not use for unannounced red team engagements — purple team exercises require explicit coordination between offensive and defensive teams with real-time collaboration.
Prerequisites
- Red team capability: internal team or contracted purple team operator
- Attack simulation tools: Atomic Red Team, MITRE Caldera, or C2 framework (authorized)
- SIEM access for real-time alert monitoring during exercise
- ATT&CK-mapped detection rule inventory with expected alert names
- Isolated test environment or approved production scope with change management approval
- Communication channel (Slack/Teams) for real-time red-blue coordination
Workflow
Step 1: Define Exercise Scope and Objectives
Document exercise parameters:
purple_team_exercise:exercise_id: PT-2024-Q1date: 2024-03-20duration: 8 hours (09:00-17:00 UTC)scope:environment: Production (Finance VLAN, 10.0.5.0/24)systems_in_scope:- WORKSTATION-TEST01 (10.0.5.100) — Test endpoint- DC-TEST (10.0.5.200) — Test domain controller- FILESERVER-TEST (10.0.5.201) — Test file serversystems_excluded:- All production domain controllers- Customer-facing systemsobjectives:- Validate 15 detection rules mapped to FIN7 TTPs- Test SOC analyst response to real attack indicators- Identify detection gaps for credential access and lateral movement- Measure detection latency for each techniquethreat_scenario: FIN7 campaign targeting financial data via spearphishingauthorization: Approved by CISO, Change Request CR-2024-0567communication: #purple-team-2024q1 Slack channel
Step 2: Build ATT&CK-Mapped Test Plan
Create technique-by-technique test matrix:
| # | ATT&CK ID | Technique | Test Tool | Expected Detection | Blue Team Metric | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | T1566.001 | Spearphishing Attachment | Manual email | Email gateway alert | Detection Y/N, latency | |
| 2 | T1204.002 | User Execution | Macro document | Sysmon process creation | Detection Y/N, latency | |
| 3 | T1059.001 | PowerShell | Atomic RT #1-3 | PowerShell execution alert | Detection Y/N, latency | |
| 4 | T1053.005 | Scheduled Task | Atomic RT | Scheduled task creation alert | Detection Y/N, latency | |
| 5 | T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys | Atomic RT | Registry modification alert | Detection Y/N, latency | |
| 6 | T1003.001 | LSASS Memory | Mimikatz | Credential dumping alert | Detection Y/N, latency | |
| 7 | T1550.002 | Pass-the-Hash | Mimikatz | NTLM anomaly detection | Detection Y/N, latency | |
| 8 | T1021.002 | SMB/PsExec | PsExec | PsExec service creation alert | Detection Y/N, latency | |
| 9 | T1047 | WMI | wmic /node | WMI remote execution alert | Detection Y/N, latency | |
| 10 | T1021.001 | RDP | xfreerdp | RDP lateral movement alert | Detection Y/N, latency | |
| 11 | T1071.001 | Web C2 | Cobalt Strike | C2 beacon detection | Detection Y/N, latency | |
| 12 | T1041 | Exfiltration C2 | Rclone | Data exfiltration alert | Detection Y/N, latency | |
| 13 | T1490 | Inhibit Recovery | vssadmin | Shadow copy deletion alert | Detection Y/N, latency | |
| 14 | T1486 | Data Encrypted | Test encryption | Mass encryption detection | Detection Y/N, latency | |
| 15 | T1070.001 | Clear Logs | wevtutil | Log clearing detection | Detection Y/N, latency |
Step 3: Execute Red Team Techniques
Run each technique with Atomic Red Team (or manual execution):
# Install Atomic Red TeamIEX (IWR 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/redcanaryco/invoke-atomicredteam/master/install-atomicredteam.ps1' -UseBasicParsing)Install-AtomicRedTeam -getAtomics# Test 1: T1059.001 — PowerShell ExecutionWrite-Host "[$(Get-Date -Format 'HH:mm:ss')] Executing T1059.001 - PowerShell"Invoke-AtomicTest T1059.001 -TestNumbers 1# Notify blue team: "T1059.001 executed at $(Get-Date)"# Test 2: T1053.005 — Scheduled Task CreationWrite-Host "[$(Get-Date -Format 'HH:mm:ss')] Executing T1053.005 - Scheduled Task"Invoke-AtomicTest T1053.005 -TestNumbers 1# Test 3: T1547.001 — Registry Run KeyWrite-Host "[$(Get-Date -Format 'HH:mm:ss')] Executing T1547.001 - Registry Persistence"Invoke-AtomicTest T1547.001 -TestNumbers 1,2# Test 4: T1003.001 — Credential DumpingWrite-Host "[$(Get-Date -Format 'HH:mm:ss')] Executing T1003.001 - LSASS Access"Invoke-AtomicTest T1003.001 -TestNumbers 1,2# Test 5: T1490 — Shadow Copy DeletionWrite-Host "[$(Get-Date -Format 'HH:mm:ss')] Executing T1490 - Inhibit Recovery"Invoke-AtomicTest T1490 -TestNumbers 1# Cleanup after each testInvoke-AtomicTest T1059.001 -TestNumbers 1 -CleanupInvoke-AtomicTest T1053.005 -TestNumbers 1 -CleanupInvoke-AtomicTest T1547.001 -TestNumbers 1,2 -Cleanup
Step 4: Monitor Blue Team Detection in Real-Time
Blue team monitors SIEM during execution:
--- Real-time purple team monitoring dashboardindex=notable earliest=-1h| where Computer IN ("WORKSTATION-TEST01", "DC-TEST", "FILESERVER-TEST")OR src IN ("10.0.5.100", "10.0.5.200", "10.0.5.201")| eval detection_latency = _time - orig_time| eval latency_seconds = round(detection_latency, 0)| sort _time| table _time, rule_name, urgency, src, dest, user, latency_seconds--- Check specific technique detectionindex=sysmon Computer="WORKSTATION-TEST01" earliest=-15m(EventCode=1 OR EventCode=3 OR EventCode=10 OR EventCode=11 OR EventCode=13)| sort _time| table _time, EventCode, Image, CommandLine, TargetFilename, TargetObject
Record results in real-time:
exercise_results = {"exercise_id": "PT-2024-Q1","results": [{"technique": "T1059.001","name": "PowerShell Execution","execution_time": "09:15:00","detected": True,"alert_name": "Suspicious PowerShell Encoded Command","detection_time": "09:15:47","latency_seconds": 47,"notes": "Detected via Sysmon EventCode 1 with encoded command pattern"},{"technique": "T1003.001","name": "LSASS Memory Access","execution_time": "10:30:00","detected": False,"alert_name": None,"detection_time": None,"latency_seconds": None,"notes": "GAP: No detection rule for LSASS access. Sysmon EventCode 10 present but no correlation rule."}]}
Step 5: Collaborative Gap Remediation
For each gap, the blue team builds detection rules immediately:
--- Gap: T1003.001 — No LSASS access detection--- Build rule during exerciseindex=sysmon EventCode=10 TargetImage="*\\lsass.exe"GrantedAccess IN ("0x1010", "0x1038", "0x1fffff", "0x40")NOT SourceImage IN ("*\\svchost.exe", "*\\csrss.exe", "*\\MsMpEng.exe")| stats count by Computer, SourceImage, SourceUser, GrantedAccess| where count > 0
After building, re-test:
Red Team: "Re-executing T1003.001 at 11:45"Blue Team: "Confirmed — alert 'LSASS Memory Access Detected' fired at 11:45:32 (32s latency)"Result: GAP CLOSED
Step 6: Generate Exercise Report
def generate_purple_team_report(results):total = len(results["results"])detected = sum(1 for r in results["results"] if r["detected"])gaps = sum(1 for r in results["results"] if not r["detected"])avg_latency = sum(r["latency_seconds"] for r in results["results"]if r["latency_seconds"]) / max(detected, 1)report = f"""PURPLE TEAM EXERCISE REPORT — {results['exercise_id']}{'=' * 60}SUMMARY:Techniques Tested: {total}Detected: {detected} ({detected/total*100:.0f}%)Gaps Identified: {gaps} ({gaps/total*100:.0f}%)Avg Detection Latency: {avg_latency:.0f} secondsDETAILED RESULTS:"""for r in results["results"]:status = "DETECTED" if r["detected"] else "GAP"latency = f"{r['latency_seconds']}s" if r["latency_seconds"] else "N/A"report += f" [{status}] {r['technique']} — {r['name']} (Latency: {latency})\n"if not r["detected"]:report += f" Action: {r['notes']}\n"return report
Key Concepts
| Term | Definition | |
|---|---|---|
| Purple Team | Collaborative exercise where red (offensive) and blue (defensive) teams work together to validate and improve detection | |
| Adversary Emulation | Structured simulation of specific threat actor TTPs for testing defensive capabilities | |
| Detection Validation | Process of confirming that detection rules fire correctly when the targeted technique is executed | |
| Detection Latency | Time between technique execution and SIEM alert generation — measured during purple team exercises | |
| Gap Remediation | Immediate creation or tuning of detection rules for techniques that were not detected during testing | |
| Atomic Red Team | Open-source library of small, focused tests for individual ATT&CK techniques |
Tools & Systems
- Atomic Red Team: Open-source attack test library from Red Canary for technique-by-technique validation
- MITRE Caldera: Automated adversary emulation platform supporting ATT&CK-mapped attack chains
- Vectr: Purple team management platform for tracking exercise results and detection coverage improvements
- Prelude Operator: Adversary emulation tool supporting automated multi-step attack scenarios
- AttackIQ: Breach and Attack Simulation (BAS) platform for continuous detection validation
Common Scenarios
- Quarterly Validation: Test top 20 detection rules against ATT&CK techniques to ensure continued effectiveness
- New Tool Validation: After deploying new EDR, validate detection coverage against baseline techniques
- Analyst Training: Junior analysts observe real attacks in real-time with expert guidance on SIEM investigation
- Post-Incident Validation: After a real incident, emulate the attack chain to verify detection improvements
- Compliance Evidence: Document detection validation results for SOC 2, ISO 27001, or PCI DSS audits
Output Format
PURPLE TEAM EXERCISE REPORT — PT-2024-Q1━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━Date: 2024-03-20 (09:00-17:00 UTC)Scenario: FIN7 Financial Sector CampaignScope: Finance VLAN (10.0.5.0/24)RESULTS:Techniques Tested: 15Detected: 11 (73%)Gaps Identified: 4 (27%)Gaps Remediated Same Day: 3Avg Detection Latency: 38 secondsDETAILED RESULTS:[PASS] T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment — 12s latency[PASS] T1204.002 User Execution (Macro) — 8s latency[PASS] T1059.001 PowerShell Execution — 47s latency[PASS] T1053.005 Scheduled Task — 23s latency[PASS] T1547.001 Registry Run Keys — 31s latency[FAIL] T1003.001 LSASS Memory Access — REMEDIATED during exercise[FAIL] T1550.002 Pass-the-Hash — REMEDIATED during exercise[PASS] T1021.002 PsExec — 15s latency[PASS] T1047 WMI Remote Execution — 42s latency[PASS] T1021.001 RDP Lateral Movement — 28s latency[FAIL] T1071.001 Web C2 Beaconing — REMEDIATED during exercise[PASS] T1041 Exfiltration over C2 — 67s latency[PASS] T1490 Shadow Copy Deletion — 5s latency[FAIL] T1486 Data Encryption for Impact — OPEN — requires endpoint telemetry[PASS] T1070.001 Event Log Clearing — 11s latencyPOST-EXERCISE COVERAGE: 93% (14/15) — up from 73% at startREMAINING GAP: T1486 requires EDR file monitoring enhancement