Skill v1.0.1
currentAutomated scan100/1001 files
version: "1.0.1" name: owasp-security description: Use when reviewing code for security vulnerabilities, implementing authentication/authorization, handling user input, or discussing web application security. Covers OWASP Top 10:2025, ASVS 5.0, and Agentic AI security (2026).
OWASP Security Best Practices Skill
Apply these security standards when writing or reviewing code.
Quick Reference: OWASP Top 10:2025
| # | Vulnerability | Key Prevention | |
|---|---|---|---|
| A01 | Broken Access Control | Deny by default, enforce server-side, verify ownership | |
| A02 | Security Misconfiguration | Harden configs, disable defaults, minimize features | |
| A03 | Supply Chain Failures | Lock versions, verify integrity, audit dependencies | |
| A04 | Cryptographic Failures | TLS 1.2+, AES-256-GCM, Argon2/bcrypt for passwords | |
| A05 | Injection | Parameterized queries, input validation, safe APIs | |
| A06 | Insecure Design | Threat model, rate limit, design security controls | |
| A07 | Auth Failures | MFA, check breached passwords, secure sessions | |
| A08 | Integrity Failures | Sign packages, SRI for CDN, safe serialization | |
| A09 | Logging Failures | Log security events, structured format, alerting | |
| A10 | Exception Handling | Fail-closed, hide internals, log with context |
Security Code Review Checklist
When reviewing code, check for these issues:
Input Handling
- [ ] All user input validated server-side
- [ ] Using parameterized queries (not string concatenation)
- [ ] Input length limits enforced
- [ ] Allowlist validation preferred over denylist
Authentication & Sessions
- [ ] Passwords hashed with Argon2/bcrypt (not MD5/SHA1)
- [ ] Session tokens have sufficient entropy (128+ bits)
- [ ] Sessions invalidated on logout
- [ ] MFA available for sensitive operations
Access Control
- [ ] Authorization checked on every request
- [ ] Using object references user cannot manipulate
- [ ] Deny by default policy
- [ ] Privilege escalation paths reviewed
Data Protection
- [ ] Sensitive data encrypted at rest
- [ ] TLS for all data in transit
- [ ] No sensitive data in URLs/logs
- [ ] Secrets in environment/vault (not code)
Error Handling
- [ ] No stack traces exposed to users
- [ ] Fail-closed on errors (deny, not allow)
- [ ] All exceptions logged with context
- [ ] Consistent error responses (no enumeration)
Secure Code Patterns
SQL Injection Prevention
# UNSAFEcursor.execute(f"SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = {user_id}")# SAFEcursor.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = %s", (user_id,))
Command Injection Prevention
# UNSAFEos.system(f"convert {filename} output.png")# SAFEsubprocess.run(["convert", filename, "output.png"], shell=False)
Password Storage
# UNSAFEhashlib.md5(password.encode()).hexdigest()# SAFEfrom argon2 import PasswordHasherPasswordHasher().hash(password)
Access Control
# UNSAFE - No authorization check@app.route('/api/user/<user_id>')def get_user(user_id):return db.get_user(user_id)# SAFE - Authorization enforced@app.route('/api/user/<user_id>')@login_requireddef get_user(user_id):if current_user.id != user_id and not current_user.is_admin:abort(403)return db.get_user(user_id)
Error Handling
# UNSAFE - Exposes internals@app.errorhandler(Exception)def handle_error(e):return str(e), 500# SAFE - Fail-closed, log context@app.errorhandler(Exception)def handle_error(e):error_id = uuid.uuid4()logger.exception(f"Error {error_id}: {e}")return {"error": "An error occurred", "id": str(error_id)}, 500
Fail-Closed Pattern
# UNSAFE - Fail-opendef check_permission(user, resource):try:return auth_service.check(user, resource)except Exception:return True # DANGEROUS!# SAFE - Fail-closeddef check_permission(user, resource):try:return auth_service.check(user, resource)except Exception as e:logger.error(f"Auth check failed: {e}")return False # Deny on error
Agentic AI Security (OWASP 2026)
When building or reviewing AI agent systems, check for:
| Risk | Description | Mitigation | |
|---|---|---|---|
| ASI01: Goal Hijack | Prompt injection alters agent objectives | Input sanitization, goal boundaries, behavioral monitoring | |
| ASI02: Tool Misuse | Tools used in unintended ways | Least privilege, fine-grained permissions, validate I/O | |
| ASI03: Privilege Abuse | Credential escalation across agents | Short-lived scoped tokens, identity verification | |
| ASI04: Supply Chain | Compromised plugins/MCP servers | Verify signatures, sandbox, allowlist plugins | |
| ASI05: Code Execution | Unsafe code generation/execution | Sandbox execution, static analysis, human approval | |
| ASI06: Memory Poisoning | Corrupted RAG/context data | Validate stored content, segment by trust level | |
| ASI07: Agent Comms | Spoofing between agents | Authenticate, encrypt, verify message integrity | |
| ASI08: Cascading Failures | Errors propagate across systems | Circuit breakers, graceful degradation, isolation | |
| ASI09: Trust Exploitation | Social engineering via AI | Label AI content, user education, verification steps | |
| ASI10: Rogue Agents | Compromised agents acting maliciously | Behavior monitoring, kill switches, anomaly detection |
Agent Security Checklist
- [ ] All agent inputs sanitized and validated
- [ ] Tools operate with minimum required permissions
- [ ] Credentials are short-lived and scoped
- [ ] Third-party plugins verified and sandboxed
- [ ] Code execution happens in isolated environments
- [ ] Agent communications authenticated and encrypted
- [ ] Circuit breakers between agent components
- [ ] Human approval for sensitive operations
- [ ] Behavior monitoring for anomaly detection
- [ ] Kill switch available for agent systems
ASVS 5.0 Key Requirements
Level 1 (All Applications)
- Passwords minimum 12 characters
- Check against breached password lists
- Rate limiting on authentication
- Session tokens 128+ bits entropy
- HTTPS everywhere
Level 2 (Sensitive Data)
- All L1 requirements plus:
- MFA for sensitive operations
- Cryptographic key management
- Comprehensive security logging
- Input validation on all parameters
Level 3 (Critical Systems)
- All L1/L2 requirements plus:
- Hardware security modules for keys
- Threat modeling documentation
- Advanced monitoring and alerting
- Penetration testing validation
Language-Specific Security Quirks
Important: The examples below are illustrative starting points, not exhaustive. When reviewing code, think like a senior security researcher: consider the language's memory model, type system, standard library pitfalls, ecosystem-specific attack vectors, and historical CVE patterns. Each language has deeper quirks beyond what's listed here.
Different languages have unique security pitfalls. Here are the top 20 languages with key security considerations. Go deeper for the specific language you're working in:
JavaScript / TypeScript
Main Risks: Prototype pollution, XSS, eval injection
// UNSAFE: Prototype pollutionObject.assign(target, userInput)// SAFE: Use null prototype or validate keysObject.assign(Object.create(null), validated)// UNSAFE: eval injectioneval(userCode)// SAFE: Never use eval with user input
Watch for: eval(), innerHTML, document.write(), prototype chain manipulation, __proto__
Python
Main Risks: Pickle deserialization, format string injection, shell injection
# UNSAFE: Pickle RCEpickle.loads(user_data)# SAFE: Use JSON or validate sourcejson.loads(user_data)# UNSAFE: Format string injectionquery = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '%s'" % user_input# SAFE: Parameterizedcursor.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = %s", (user_input,))
Watch for: pickle, eval(), exec(), os.system(), subprocess with shell=True
Java
Main Risks: Deserialization RCE, XXE, JNDI injection
// UNSAFE: Arbitrary deserializationObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(userStream);Object obj = ois.readObject();// SAFE: Use allowlist or JSONObjectMapper mapper = new ObjectMapper();mapper.readValue(json, SafeClass.class);
Watch for: ObjectInputStream, Runtime.exec(), XML parsers without XXE protection, JNDI lookups
C#
Main Risks: Deserialization, SQL injection, path traversal
// UNSAFE: BinaryFormatter RCEBinaryFormatter bf = new BinaryFormatter();object obj = bf.Deserialize(stream);// SAFE: Use System.Text.Jsonvar obj = JsonSerializer.Deserialize<SafeType>(json);
Watch for: BinaryFormatter, JavaScriptSerializer, TypeNameHandling.All, raw SQL strings
PHP
Main Risks: Type juggling, file inclusion, object injection
// UNSAFE: Type juggling in authif ($password == $stored_hash) { ... }// SAFE: Use strict comparisonif (hash_equals($stored_hash, $password)) { ... }// UNSAFE: File inclusioninclude($_GET['page'] . '.php');// SAFE: Allowlist pages$allowed = ['home', 'about']; include(in_array($page, $allowed) ? "$page.php" : 'home.php');
Watch for: == vs ===, include/require, unserialize(), preg_replace with /e, extract()
Go
Main Risks: Race conditions, template injection, slice bounds
// UNSAFE: Race conditiongo func() { counter++ }()// SAFE: Use sync primitivesatomic.AddInt64(&counter, 1)// UNSAFE: Template injectiontemplate.HTML(userInput)// SAFE: Let template escape{{.UserInput}}
Watch for: Goroutine data races, template.HTML(), unsafe package, unchecked slice access
Ruby
Main Risks: Mass assignment, YAML deserialization, regex DoS
# UNSAFE: Mass assignmentUser.new(params[:user])# SAFE: Strong parametersUser.new(params.require(:user).permit(:name, :email))# UNSAFE: YAML RCEYAML.load(user_input)# SAFE: Use safe_loadYAML.safe_load(user_input)
Watch for: YAML.load, Marshal.load, eval, send with user input, .permit!
Rust
Main Risks: Unsafe blocks, FFI boundary issues, integer overflow in release
// CAUTION: Unsafe bypasses safetyunsafe { ptr::read(user_ptr) }// CAUTION: Release integer overflowlet x: u8 = 255;let y = x + 1; // Wraps to 0 in release!// SAFE: Use checked arithmeticlet y = x.checked_add(1).unwrap_or(255);
Watch for: unsafe blocks, FFI calls, integer overflow in release builds, .unwrap() on untrusted input
Swift
Main Risks: Force unwrapping crashes, Objective-C interop
// UNSAFE: Force unwrap on untrusted datalet value = jsonDict["key"]!// SAFE: Safe unwrappingguard let value = jsonDict["key"] else { return }// UNSAFE: Format stringString(format: userInput, args)// SAFE: Don't use user input as format
Watch for: force unwrap (!), try!, ObjC bridging, NSSecureCoding misuse
Kotlin
Main Risks: Null safety bypass, Java interop, serialization
// UNSAFE: Platform type from Javaval len = javaString.length // NPE if null// SAFE: Explicit null checkval len = javaString?.length ?: 0// UNSAFE: Reflectionclazz.getDeclaredMethod(userInput)// SAFE: Allowlist methods
Watch for: Java interop nulls (! operator), reflection, serialization, platform types
C / C++
Main Risks: Buffer overflow, use-after-free, format string
// UNSAFE: Buffer overflowchar buf[10]; strcpy(buf, userInput);// SAFE: Bounds checkingstrncpy(buf, userInput, sizeof(buf) - 1);// UNSAFE: Format stringprintf(userInput);// SAFE: Always use format specifierprintf("%s", userInput);
Watch for: strcpy, sprintf, gets, pointer arithmetic, manual memory management, integer overflow
Scala
Main Risks: XML external entities, serialization, pattern matching exhaustiveness
// UNSAFE: XXEval xml = XML.loadString(userInput)// SAFE: Disable external entitiesval factory = SAXParserFactory.newInstance()factory.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-general-entities", false)
Watch for: Java interop issues, XML parsing, Serializable, exhaustive pattern matching
R
Main Risks: Code injection, file path manipulation
# UNSAFE: eval injectioneval(parse(text = user_input))# SAFE: Never parse user input as code# UNSAFE: Path traversalread.csv(paste0("data/", user_file))# SAFE: Validate filenameif (grepl("^[a-zA-Z0-9]+\\.csv$", user_file)) read.csv(...)
Watch for: eval(), parse(), source(), system(), file path manipulation
Perl
Main Risks: Regex injection, open() injection, taint mode bypass
# UNSAFE: Regex DoS$input =~ /$user_pattern/;# SAFE: Use quotemeta$input =~ /\Q$user_pattern\E/;# UNSAFE: open() command injectionopen(FILE, $user_file);# SAFE: Three-argument openopen(my $fh, '<', $user_file);
Watch for: Two-arg open(), regex from user input, backticks, eval, disabled taint mode
Shell (Bash)
Main Risks: Command injection, word splitting, globbing
# UNSAFE: Unquoted variablesrm $user_file# SAFE: Always quoterm "$user_file"# UNSAFE: evaleval "$user_command"# SAFE: Never eval user input
Watch for: Unquoted variables, eval, backticks, $(...) with user input, missing set -euo pipefail
Lua
Main Risks: Sandbox escape, loadstring injection
-- UNSAFE: Code injectionloadstring(user_code)()-- SAFE: Use sandboxed environment with restricted functions
Watch for: loadstring, loadfile, dofile, os.execute, io library, debug library
Elixir
Main Risks: Atom exhaustion, code injection, ETS access
# UNSAFE: Atom exhaustion DoSString.to_atom(user_input)# SAFE: Use existing atoms onlyString.to_existing_atom(user_input)# UNSAFE: Code injectionCode.eval_string(user_input)# SAFE: Never eval user input
Watch for: String.to_atom, Code.eval_string, :erlang.binary_to_term, ETS public tables
Dart / Flutter
Main Risks: Platform channel injection, insecure storage
// UNSAFE: Storing secrets in SharedPreferencesprefs.setString('auth_token', token);// SAFE: Use flutter_secure_storagesecureStorage.write(key: 'auth_token', value: token);
Watch for: Platform channel data, dart:mirrors, Function.apply, insecure local storage
PowerShell
Main Risks: Command injection, execution policy bypass
# UNSAFE: InjectionInvoke-Expression $userInput# SAFE: Avoid Invoke-Expression with user data# UNSAFE: Unvalidated pathGet-Content $userPath# SAFE: Validate path is within allowed directory
Watch for: Invoke-Expression, & $userVar, Start-Process with user args, -ExecutionPolicy Bypass
SQL (All Dialects)
Main Risks: Injection, privilege escalation, data exfiltration
-- UNSAFE: String concatenation"SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = " + userId-- SAFE: Parameterized query (language-specific)-- Use prepared statements in ALL cases
Watch for: Dynamic SQL, EXECUTE IMMEDIATE, stored procedures with dynamic queries, privilege grants
Deep Security Analysis Mindset
When reviewing any language, think like a senior security researcher:
- Memory Model: How does the language handle memory? Managed vs manual? GC pauses exploitable?
- Type System: Weak typing = type confusion attacks. Look for coercion exploits.
- Serialization: Every language has its pickle/Marshal equivalent. All are dangerous.
- Concurrency: Race conditions, TOCTOU, atomicity failures specific to the threading model.
- FFI Boundaries: Native interop is where type safety breaks down.
- Standard Library: Historic CVEs in std libs (Python urllib, Java XML, Ruby OpenSSL).
- Package Ecosystem: Typosquatting, dependency confusion, malicious packages.
- Build System: Makefile/gradle/npm script injection during builds.
- Runtime Behavior: Debug vs release differences (Rust overflow, C++ assertions).
- Error Handling: How does the language fail? Silently? With stack traces? Fail-open?
For any language not listed: Research its specific CWE patterns, CVE history, and known footguns. The examples above are entry points, not complete coverage.
When to Apply This Skill
Use this skill when:
- Writing authentication or authorization code
- Handling user input or external data
- Implementing cryptography or password storage
- Reviewing code for security vulnerabilities
- Designing API endpoints
- Building AI agent systems
- Configuring application security settings
- Handling errors and exceptions
- Working with third-party dependencies
- Working in any language - apply the deep analysis mindset above